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Abstract
In several cases, comparative law exercises have been given excessive weight, which has 
given rise to confl icting interpretations in the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR). This use of the comparative law method by the Court has been widely 
criticised. The critical voices have generally argued in terms of what is prohibited by the 
principle of the rule of law, which the Court itself is also bound to take into account, namely 
the arbitrary use of power. In the light of these criticisms, it is a challenging task to examine 
whether and to what extent the comparative law method complies with the principle of the 
rule of law, which is the aim of this paper. An analysis of several ECtHR cases demonstrates 
that in many respects the comparative exercises of the Court indeed do not comply with 
the requirements set by the formal conception of the rule of law. The application of the 
comparative law method is neither consistent nor suffi ciently transparent. In addition to 
exploring the problematic aspects of the application of the comparative law method, the 
paper also formulates some recommendations in order to bring this method into accordance 
with the principle of the rule of law.
1 Introduction
The principle of the rule of law is one of the most fundamental principles of law. 
Explicitly or implicitly, it pervades all spheres of legal life.1 It is not disputed that 
the general aim or the underlying idea of the rule of law is to limit the exercise of 
public power. While Plato focused on the restraint of tyranny,2 during the Middle 
Ages the principle of the rule of law was used to limit the king’s omnipotence, and 
* PhD Candidate, Erasmus School of Law, Rotterdam. I am deeply grateful to Professor J. Gerards, 
K. Henrard and M. Busstra for their constructive and valuable comments and suggestions. The usual 
disclaimer applies.
1 The literature on the principle of the rule of law is abundant. See inter alia T. J. Zywicki, ‘The Rule of 
Law, Freedom, and Prosperity’ (2003) 10 Supreme Court Economic Review 1; M. Rosenfeld, ‘The Rule 
of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy’ (2001) 74 Southern California Law Review 
5; R. H. Fallon, Jr., ‘ “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse’ (1997) 97 Columbia 
Law Review 1; N. S. Marsh, ‘The Rule of Law as a Supra-National Concept’, in A. G. Guest (ed.), 
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (1961); A. L. Goodhart, ‘The Rule of Law and Absolute Sovereignty’ 
(1958) 106 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 7; M. J. Radin, ‘Reconsidering the Rule of Law’ 
(1989) 69 Boston University Law Review 4; D. Kochenov, The Failure of Conditionality. Pre-accession 
Conditionality in the Fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law: A Legal Appraisal of EU Enlargement 
(2007) (providing a good overview of the literature in this respect).
2 B. Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law (2004) at 10.
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more recently it has become the limit of the arbitrary use of power by the executive.3 
Although this principle is generally considered to constitute the limits of the power 
of the government,4 it can arguably also be applied with respect to any public 
institutions having the power to take far-reaching decisions on questions related to 
the life of persons, as this power might also give rise to arbitrary use. The judiciary, 
including the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), whose practice forms the 
special focus of this paper, is such an institution: it delivers decisions that have a 
profound effect on individuals.5 Relevantly, Judge Martens of the ECtHR explains in 
one of his dissenting opinions that ‘[t]he rule of law – that essential protection of the 
individual to which the Preamble of the Convention refers and which the European 
Court is bound to take into account – … requires that the individual … be secured … 
protection against … powerful entities …’.6 It follows from Judge Martens argument 
that the Court itself is also bound by the principle of the rule of law, which in his 
words entails the essential protection of individuals against powerful entities.
 Arguably, adjudication can be regarded as being in harmony with the principle 
of the rule of law if all aspects of this process comply with it. In other words, the 
principle of the rule of law should be respected in each and every moment of the 
adjudication process. Accordingly, it can also be examined whether the comparative 
law method applied by the Court, which in several cases has been given quite 
signifi cant weight, also lives up to the principle of the rule of law. Besides cases 
in which the comparative exercise played an important  role, the Court has also 
carried out comparative exercises in order to make some supporting arguments for 
some of its decisions.7 In these latter cases, however, the comparison carries little (or 
less) weight, which means that it is less important to what extent this comparison 
complies with the rule of law. Accordingly, the paper only addresses those cases in 
which the result of comparison proved to be decisive or signifi cant in terms of the 
ultimate decision.
 The comparative law method applied by the ECtHR has invited severe criticism. 
It has been argued, inter alia, that in the case law of the Court the comparison 
is carried out randomly, that it is superfi cial and that it is interpreted arbitrarily. 
These observations are even more striking in the light of the view that ‘for some 
comparatists, the attraction of comparative legal study is that it is a means of “putting 
legal science on a sure and realistic basis”.’8 In other words, the comparative law 
method is often regarded as bringing objectivity into legal reasoning.9 Remarkably, 
these criticisms use the language of what is generally seen as prohibited by the rule 
of law: arbitrary use of power. In this light, it seems to be an exciting task to examine 
whether and to what extent the ECtHR’s comparative law method in fact meets the 
requirements of the rule of law.
 First of all, this paper identifi es the implications of the rule of law requirements to 
the comparative law method. Against the background of this theoretical framework, 
3 For an overview on the development of the concept of the rule of law, see Tamanaha, above n. 2.
4 See inter alia Tamanaha, above n. 2, at 10.
5 The European Court of Human Rights itself has also accepted this position. Judge Zupančič, for 
instance, argued that ‘[o]ne must constantly keep in mind the original intent of all judicial confl ict-
resolution, which is to resolve by logic what would otherwise be resolved by arbitrariness, force, etc. 
The essence of the rule of law is that the logic of private force be replaced by the public force of logic.’ 
Nuutinen v. Finland, ECHR (2000), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Zupančič, joined by Judges Panţîru 
and Türmen.
6 Gustaffson v. Sweden, ECHR (1996), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Martens, joined by Judge 
Matscher (emphasis added).
7 The author would like to thank M. Busstra for drawing her attention to this point.
8 R. Cotterrell, ‘Seeking Similarity, Appreciating Difference: Comparative Law and Communities’, 
in A. Harding and E. Örücü, Comparative Law in the 21st Country (2002) 35 at 37. Cotterrel cites 
K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (1998) at 33.
9 See also E. Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity (2001) at 419.
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it then performs a detailed analysis of the case law of the ECtHR. Each section 
starts by presenting the problematic aspects of the comparative law method on the 
basis of the case law of the Court. These issues are subsequently analysed from the 
perspective of the rule of law.
2 The Rule of Law and the Comparative Law Method: Setting the 
Framework
The importance of the principle of the rule of law is also discernible in the abundant 
academic literature on this topic. On the basis of these academic discussions, two 
main conceptions of the rule of law can be distilled: the substantive conception 
and the formal conception.10 Tamanaha summarises the differences between these 
conceptions as follows: ‘[f]ormal theories focus on the proper sources and form 
of legality, while substantive theories also include requirements about the content 
of the law.’11 In other words, the formal theory of the rule of law does not impose 
any requirements on the content or substance of the law. In view of the fact that 
methodological questions are concerned with formal or procedural considerations 
and do not address substantive matters, this paper only devotes attention to the formal 
approach concerning the rule of law. It has been argued that, roughly speaking, the 
essence of the formal conception of the rule of law concerns the requirement that the 
law should be capable of guiding one’s conduct.12 Often, further requirements are 
also presented in terms of the formal concept of the rule of law. The most frequently 
recurring requirements include: the law has to be correctly passed, the law should be 
clear, the law should be relatively stable and so forth. On the basis of these criteria, 
the broad requirement that the law should be capable of guiding the conduct of people 
can arguably be broken down to three sub-criteria: laws can provide guidance if they 
are correctly passed and if they are transparent and consistent.
 In order to be able to analyse the comparative law method as applied by the 
ECtHR, these requirements have to be adapted to this particular method. First of all, 
it is not the law that is analysed here, but the method used by the ECtHR when it 
engages in comparisons. Secondly, it is the Court and not the legislator that has to 
comply with the rule of law. Consequently, in terms of the comparative law method 
of the Court, the formal concept of the rule of law means that the comparative law 
method should be capable of guiding the Court’s reasoning and the conduct of 
people.
 In addition to this, the three sub-criteria set for the law in order to be capable of 
guiding conduct also have to be transposed to the comparative law method.13 The 
criterion of being correctly passed refers to the way (method) in which the law is 
adopted. In this context, it can be argued that the comparison has to be carried out in a 
methodologically correct way in order to be regarded as correctly passed. The criterion 
of being methodologically correct can, arguably, be divided into three questions that 
deserve separate consideration: why, what and how to compare. The fi rst question 
(why to compare) necessitates the identifi cation of the aim of comparison. The 
10 See inter alia P. Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical 
Framework’ (1997) Public Law (Autumn); Radin, above n. 1, at 793; M. L. Fernandez Esteban, The 
Rule of Law in the European Constitution (1999) at 91-97.
11 Tamanaha, above n. 2, at. 92.
12 Kochenov, above n. 1, at 98-102.
13 The literature on the comparative law method is very rich. See inter alia K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, 
Introduction to Comparative Law (1998); M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann, The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law (2006); P. de Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World (1999); H. K. Gutteridge, 
Comparative Law: An Introduction to the Comparative Method of Legal Study and Research (1949); 
R. Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law (2005).
356 MÓNIKA AMBRUS 
second question (what to compare) refers to the sources of comparison and the levels 
of abstraction with respect to the comparison.14 The last question (how to compare) 
examines the way in which the comparison is carried out. In order to comply with the 
requirements of the rule of law, furthermore, all these aspects have to be addressed 
in a consistent and transparent manner. Transparency can, arguably, be read as a 
discernable and logical build-up of arguments. Consistency can be seen as referring 
to theoretical consistency in the application of the method and consistency across the 
cases.
 Hereinafter, the paper will focus on the answers in the case law of the Court to 
the above-mentioned questions of why, what and how to compare. Each question 
is divided into sub-elements. With regard to every element, this paper examines 
whether and to what extent the particular issue can be regarded as being in line with 
the requirements of transparency and consistency.
3 Why to Compare
At the time of its adoption, the European Convention on Human Rights aimed to 
lay down minimum standards, i.e. to function as the lowest common denominator 
among the member states of the Council of Europe.15 This approach is generally 
based on the argument that the Court respects the sovereignty of the states and that 
it also needs the cooperation of the states parties, since it is ultimately for them to 
enforce the Court’s decisions. In other words, the Court has adopted the position 
that its role is subsidiary to that of the contracting states.16 It has been argued that 
the subsidiarity principle refers to ‘the subsidiary role of the Convention machinery 
and entails fi rst of all what may be termed a “procedural relationship” between the 
national authorities responsible for implementing the Convention and deciding 
human rights issues on the one hand and the Convention institutions on the other.’17 
Based on this subsidiarity approach, the Court has elaborated its doctrine of the 
margin of appreciation, describing the extent of discretion the respondent states have 
in concrete cases when it comes to legitimate limitations. In determining the latitude 
a state has for defi ning whether a certain limitation to the right is necessary, the Court 
has often relied on comparative arguments, mainly in the form of searching for a 
common European standard. In addition to this, the Court also uses comparative 
considerations in order to determine the scope of the rights and obligations enshrined 
in the Convention.
 The following sub-sections explain what these two purposes (determining the 
margin of appreciation and assessing the scope of rights and obligations) mean and 
how they have been combined with the comparative law method. Subsequently, it 
will be analysed whether and to what extent the comparative exercises of the Court 
comply with the requirements of transparency and consistency.
3.1 Margin of Appreciation
As expressed by the Court, the particular extent of the margin of appreciation has 
to be determined on a case-by-case basis. A couple of factors that play a role in the 
Court’s specifi cation of the concrete latitude given to the state have been identifi ed 
14 Cotterrell, above n. 8, at 36.
15 See inter alia Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of 
Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (2001) at 3; Brems, above n. 9, at 360-361.
16 See inter alia Arai-Takahashi, above n. 15, at 3.
17 H. Petzold, ‘The Convention and the Principle of Subsidiarity’, in R. MacDonald et al. (eds), The 
European System for the Protection of Human Rights (1993) 41 at 49.
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by the Court as well as by scholars.18 As mentioned above, one frequently recurring 
and often decisive factor is the examination of the existence or lack of a so-called 
common European standard. According to the Court if ‘[t]he domestic law and 
practice of the Contracting States reveal a fairly substantial measure of common 
ground’ in a certain area, ‘a more extensive European supervision corresponds to a 
less discretionary power of appreciation.’19 In contrast, in the absence of a common 
view among the contracting states, the respondent government is given broad 
discretion.
 However, the Court’s application of the concept of the margin of appreciation 
is, arguably, far from being transparent and consistent. A lack of transparency 
and consistency can be identifi ed in relation to at least four issues: conceptual 
considerations; the phase in which the margin of appreciation is determined; 
combining this concept with certain principles of interpretation; and the sources of 
comparison. As this last issue is addressed in a separate section, the present section 
focuses solely on the other three issues.
 The doctrine of the margin of appreciation in the case law of the Court is often 
intertwined with the proportionality test carried out by the Court in relation to the 
limitations on the exercise of fundamental rights.20 For this reason, it is not surprising 
that the Court frequently relies on comparative considerations ‘in the evaluation of 
the proportionality or the reasonableness of an interference with a protected right, 
i.e. in the balancing between the right and the community interest (or the right of 
the other person) justifying its restriction.’21 In fact, the Court has in many instances 
applied comparative arguments in the justifi cation phase in which it examined (or 
should have examined) the proportionality of a given measure. The reason for this lies 
in the fact that the margin of discretion is determined with respect to the legitimate 
aim that the respondent aims to achieve with the challenged measure.22 In other 
words, the defi nition of the actual extent of discretion enjoyed by the state takes 
place in the phase when the Court examines the proportionality of the limitations 
imposed by the state on the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms. However, 
in many cases, the lack of a common approach has given too broad a discretion to 
the respondent state, which has led to very superfi cial or even no scrutiny of the 
respondent’s arguments. In fact, this approach has resulted in the phenomenon that 
the broad margin of appreciation has served as a justifi cation, and, vice versa, that the 
narrow margin has almost automatically excluded the possibility of the respondent to 
justify the interference with the right in question.23 For instance, in the Marckx case, 
the respondent state’s justifi cation was rejected by the Court on the basis that there 
was a narrow margin of appreciation, as there was a common European standard.24 
In contrast, due to the lack of a common European approach in the Sheffi eld case, 
the respondent state’s margin of appreciation served as a justifi cation. In this case, 
the Court explained that ‘[t]he Court is … not persuaded that it should depart 
18 See inter alia K. Henrard, Mensenrechten vanuit internationaal en nationaal perspectief (2008) at 
201-202; R.K.M. Smith, Textbook on International Human Rights (2007) at 165.
19 Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (1979) Series A, No. 30, 59.
20 See inter alia Arai-Takahashi, above n. 15, at 14; G. Letsas, ‘Two Concepts of the Margin of 
Appreciation’ (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 705 at 711.
21 Brems, above n. 9, at 412.
22 Concerning Articles 8-11, these aims are a given, since they are laid down in the second paragraph 
of the respective articles. A certain proportionality test is also carried out with regard to the other 
articles, in the context of which it is the legitimate aim concerning which the margin of appreciation 
can be established.
23 In Letsas’ words ‘[t]he Court has used this doctrine extensively, albeit not at all coherently, to grant 
contracting states an area of legislative power that escapes judicial review.’ G. Letsas, ‘The Truth in 
Autonomous Concepts: How to Interpret the ECHR?’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International 
Law 279 at 296.
24 Marckx v. Belgium, ECHR (1979) 41.
358 MÓNIKA AMBRUS 
from its Rees and Cossey decisions and conclude that on the basis of scientifi c and 
legal developments alone the respondent State can no longer rely on a margin of 
appreciation to defend its continuing refusal to recognise in law a transsexual’s post-
operative gender.’25 
 In contrast to this approach, it seems that the Court has distinguished the test of 
proportionality from the determination of the margin of appreciation in at least one 
case. In the recent Evans case, the Court fi rst addressed the extent of the discretion, 
which was found to be broad as there was no common ground among the member 
states, and only afterwards turned its attention to the question whether the article 
concerned has been complied with. It concluded that ‘given the lack of European 
consensus on this point, the fact that the domestic rules were clear and brought to the 
attention of the applicant and that they struck a fair balance between the competing 
interests, there has been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention.’26 Accordingly, 
it can be seen here that the extent of the discretion merely defi ned the intensity with 
which the proportionality test was carried out.
 The way in which the Court has used the doctrine of the margin of appreciation 
has been criticised by many scholars as being inconsistent either theoretically or 
across cases.27 It has been suggested that, from a theoretical perspective, a distinction 
should be made between the determination of the margin of appreciation and the 
actual balancing exercise of the proportionality test, as different factors have to be 
considered in the establishment of these two matters. For this reason, the margin 
of appreciation should solely determine the intensity of review with which the 
proportionality test is carried out, as in the Evans case, and the comparative exercises 
should be carried out with respect to the determination of the particular extent of 
discretion. This would also mean that some kind of proportionality test should be 
carried out in each and every case28 and that the broad margin of appreciation cannot 
serve as a justifi cation.
 Closely related to this issue is the question in which phase of the adjudication 
the Court determines the extent of the discretion. As explained above, the Court 
has generally and traditionally defi ned the margin of appreciation during the phase 
in which it examined whether the challenged measure was necessary – which is 
quite logical in the view of the relationship between the determination of the margin 
of appreciation and the proportionality test. This was the case, for instance, in the 
Sunday Times,29 Müller,30 Dickson31 and Stoll32 cases. However, as mentioned, in a 
recent case the Court devoted its attention to the margin analysis at the beginning of 
the adjudication process, in a phase apparently separated from the proportionality 
test.33 Examining the extent of the margin of appreciation in a separate phase (or at 
least in a manner that is clearly separate) is more consistent with and conforms to a 
greater extent to the theory behind the margin of appreciation, thus enhancing the 
proper use of the doctrine.
 Last but not least, the determination of the margin of appreciation has been 
combined with two principles of interpretation: evolutive interpretation and 
25 Sheffi eld and Horsham v. the United Kingdom, ECHR (1998), 58 (emphasis added).
26 Evans v. The United Kingdom, ECHR (2007), 92.
27 See inter alia P. Mahoney, ‘The Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism?’ 
(1998) 19 Human Rights Law Review 1 at 4; K. Henrard and M. Busstra, ‘Confl icting Fundamental 
Rights: Broad Parameters for a Model of Review’ (manuscript) at 9-10.
28 Henrard and Busstra, above n. 27, at 9-12; Letsas, above n. 20.
29 Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, ECHR (1979) Series A, No. 30.
30 Müller v. Switzerland, ECHR (1988) Series A, No. 133.
31 Dickson v. the United Kingdom, ECHR (2006); Dickson v. the United Kingdom, ECHR (2007).
32 Stoll v. Switzerland, ECHR (2006).
33 See for instance Evans v. the United Kingdom, ECHR (2007), 81.
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autonomous interpretation.34 It has been argued that these principles contradict each 
other and the margin of appreciation doctrine.35 Theoretically, evolutive interpretation 
means that the interpretation of certain terms of the Convention might change over 
time in accordance with changes in European (or other) societies – a comparative 
exercise is thus inherent in this principle. Evolutive interpretation was invoked, 
for instance, in the Sheffi eld case with respect to the use of ‘protection of morals’ 
as a justifi cation ground. The Court established that, at the time when the dispute 
took place, no evolution could be discovered concerning the public acceptance of 
transsexuals. Specifi cally, ‘the Court is not fully satisfi ed that the legislative trends 
outlined by amicus suffi ce to establish the existence of any common European 
approach to the problems created by the recognition in law of post-operative gender 
status.’36 Since there was no evolution in this fi eld, the margin of appreciation given 
to the respondent state was considered to be broad.
 In contrast, the autonomous interpretation emphasises that the Convention 
constitutes a legal order that is different from that of the contracting states. Thus, in 
principle, comparison becomes unnecessary. Strikingly, however, the Court has also 
looked for a common position in several cases in which it based its arguments on the 
principle of autonomous interpretation. In the Sunday Times case, for instance, the 
Court argued that ‘the expression “authority and impartiality of the judiciary” has to 
be understood “within the meaning of the Convention”.’37 This means that ‘[i]f and 
to the extent that Article 10(2) was prompted by the notions underlying either the 
English law of contempt of court or any other similar domestic institution, it cannot 
have adopted them as they stood: it transposed them into an autonomous context.’38 
Still, the Court added that ‘[t]he domestic law and practice of the Contracting States 
reveal a fairly substantive measure of common ground in this area.’39
 The comparative method was thus invoked with regard to both principles, which 
gives the impression that, in practice, in contrast to the apparently underlying idea, 
the autonomous interpretation is not (or at least not always) independent from the law 
and practice in the member states. However, one has to remember that this elaboration 
was made with respect to a legitimate aim that might justify an interference with the 
right at stake and with respect to which the margin of appreciation is (and should be) 
ascertained. As explained above, for the determination of a state’s concrete latitude, 
it is conceptually appropriate to examine (as one of the factors) whether a common 
European standard exists. Arguably, it is quite misleading to talk about principles of 
interpretation in the context of specifi c legitimate aims pertaining to the justifi cation 
clauses of Articles 8-11. In fact, the key issue is the diffi culty of determining the 
(non-)existence of a common ground. In other words, in the Sunday Times case 
it would have been more appropriate to state that there was a narrow margin of 
appreciation, as there is a common position on the legitimate aim of protecting 
‘the authority and impartiality of the judiciary’, while with respect to the aim of 
protecting morals in the Sheffi eld case a more thorough and elaborated comparative 
examination was necessary, on the basis of which it could be established that there 
was no common position. Arguably, in the Sunday Times case, it was the fact that 
34 When discussing the principles of autonomous and evolutive interpretations, Brems considers the 
margin of appreciation as another principle of interpretation. Arguably, however, it is not the margin 
of appreciation in the above meaning that can be regarded as the third principle of interpretation, but 
rather the so-called ‘better placed’ argument (i.e. the contracting state is better placed or better suited 
to decide on a certain issue). If this is the case, the margin of appreciation of the respondent becomes 
broader. Brems, above n. 9, at 360.
35 See inter alia Brems, above n. 9, at 395.
36 Sheffi eld and Horsham v. the United Kingdom, ECHR (1998), 57.
37 Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, ECHR (1979) Series A, No. 30, 59.
38 Id., at 60.
39 Id., at 59.
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there was a common agreement that made the Court talk about the autonomous 
meaning of the expression at stake. In contrast, in the Sheffi eld case, the Court’s 
reasoning in terms of an evolutive interpretation originated from the reality that it 
had to look at the evolution of the acceptance of transsexuals in order to establish 
whether a common position existed. To put it simply, in order to be transparent 
and theoretically consistent concerning the examination of the legitimate aims for 
assessing the extent of the discretion enjoyed by the state, the Court should not use 
or refer to the language of the principles of interpretation.40
 In sum, the principle of the rule of law requires that the Court be more clear, 
explicit and conceptually consistent regarding the application of the doctrine of 
margin of appreciation. The doctrine of the margin of appreciation can in principle 
be determined by searching for a common position. However, the result of the 
comparison should merely defi ne the concrete latitude of discretion enjoyed by 
the respondent state and should not preclude the application of the proportionality 
test.41 In order to clearly distinguish the determination of the margin of appreciation 
from the justifi cation phase, it is strongly recommended that the Court defi ne the 
concrete margin separately. Finally, the Court should avoid using the language of the 
principles of interpretation when it comes to examining legitimate aims in order to 
determine the latitude given to a state in a particular case.
3.2 Scope of Rights and Obligations
In addition to assessing the particular margin of appreciation a state enjoys, the Court 
also determines the scope of rights and obligations. In the assessment of this matter, 
the Court has often relied on the comparative law method. In several cases, the result 
of this assessment was decisive in terms of whether there was an interference with 
a particular right.42 The term ‘scope of rights and obligations’ is meant to refer to 
those provisions of the Convention that lay down the various rights and obligations 
and does not include the terms in the exception clauses. The scope of the rights was 
at stake, for instance, in cases concerning freedom of association,43 civil rights and 
obligations,44 the duty to work in detention45 and degrading or inhuman punishment.46 
Moreover, the reach of certain articles has been expanded by positive obligations47 
whose scope has in many instances also been determined by means of comparative 
exercises.48
 With respect to freedom of association in the National Union of the Belgian 
Police case, for instance, the Court established the scope of the right to freedom of 
association by means of comparison, concluding that 
40 Similarly, scholars should also refrain from using the terminology of principles of interpretation in 
the context of assessing the margin of appreciation.
41 In the view of the dissenters in the Evans case, ‘the margin of appreciation should not prevent the 
Court from exercising its control, in particular in relation to the question whether a fair balance between 
all competing interests has been struck at the domestic level. The Court should not use the margin of 
appreciation principle as a merely pragmatic substitute for a thought-out approach to the problem of 
proper scope of review.’ Evans v. The United Kingdom, ECHR (2007), Joint Dissenting Opinion of 
Judges Türmen, Tsatsa-Nikolovska, Spielmann and Ziemele, para 12.
42 See also Brems, above n. 9, at 413.
43 See, for instance, National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium, ECHR (1975) Series A, No. 19; 
Demír and Others v. Turkey, ECHR (1998). See also Brems, above n. 9, at 413-414.
44 König v. Federal Republic of Germany, ECHR (1978) Series A, No. 27.
45 De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, ECHR (1979) Series A, No. 58, 90.
46 Albert and Le Compte v. Belgium, ECHR (1983), Series A, No. 58.
47 See, for instance, the extension of the scope of Article 2 to environment-related issues in Öneryildiz 
v. Turkey, ECHR (2002) and Öneryildiz v. Turkey, ECHR (2004).
48 See also Brems, above n. 9, at 413.
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while Article 11 para. 1 … presents trade union freedom as one form or a special aspect of freedom of 
association, the Article … does not guarantee any particular treatment of trade unions, or their members, 
by the State, such as the right to be consulted by it. Not only is this latter right not mentioned in Article 
11 para. 1 …, but neither can it be said that all the Contracting States in general incorporate it in their 
national law or practice, or that it is indispensable for the effective enjoyment of trade union freedom. It 
is thus not an element necessarily inherent in a right guaranteed by the Convention, which distinguishes 
it from the ‘right to a court’ embodied in Article 6….49 
Similarly, in the Sigurður case, the Court accepted that 
[c]ompulsory membership of this nature … does not exist under the laws of the great majority of the 
Contracting States. On the contrary, a large number of domestic systems contain safeguards which, in 
one way or another, guarantee the negative aspect of the freedom of association, that is the freedom not 
to join or to withdraw from an association.50
Concerning the assessment of the scope of rights and obligations in combination 
with comparative exercises, there are at least two matters of concern in terms of 
the requirements of the rule of law. The most visible of these is the combination of 
the comparative law method with the above-mentioned principles of interpretation. 
Moreover, like assessing the margin of appreciation, the determination of the scope 
of rights and obligations also raises complications as to the sources of comparison 
from a conceptual perspective. This issue will be addressed in the next section.
 Similarly to the margin of appreciation, the comparative law method has been 
combined with the principle of either autonomous or evolutive interpretation in 
many instances involving the determination of the scope of rights and obligations. As 
explained above, it seems conceptually incorrect to carry out comparative exercises 
in combination with the principle of autonomous interpretation, while a comparative 
approach is inherent in the evolutive interpretation.
 Notwithstanding the immanent conceptual diffi culties, the Court has combined 
the principle of autonomous interpretation with some comparative exercises, for 
instance in the König case, in order to establish what the term ‘civil rights and 
obligations’ means. Here, the Court established that 
[w]hilst the Court thus concludes that the concept of ‘civil rights and obligations’ is autonomous, it 
nevertheless does not consider that, in this context, the legislation of the State concerned is without 
importance. … In the exercise of its supervisory functions, the Court must also take account of the 
object and purpose of the Convention and the national legal systems of the other Contracting States.’51 
Similarly, the autonomous meaning of ‘criminal law’ was also defi ned with the 
help of a comparative exercise in the Öztürk case. Here, ‘having reaffi rmed the 
“autonomy” of the notion “criminal”,’52 the Court explained that ‘misconduct of the 
kind committed by Mr. Öztürk continues to be classifi ed as part of the criminal law 
in the vast majority of the Contracting States.’53 
 Likewise, the Court has combined the evolutive interpretation with a comparative 
approach, among others, in order to determine the scope of the right to freedom of 
association. In the Demír case, for instance, it argued that 
[i]n the light of [the] developments, the Court considers that its case-law to the effect that the right to 
bargain collectively and to enter into collective agreements does not constitute an inherent element of 
Article 11 … should be reconsidered, so as to take account of the perceptible evolution in such matters, 
in both international law and domestic legal systems.54
In terms of these principles of interpretation, and irrespective of the question whether 
they are applied in order to assess the margin of appreciation or the scope of rights 
and obligations, Letsas argues that, if combined with the comparative approach, both 
49 National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium, ECHR (1975) Series A, No. 19, 38.
50 Sigurður A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, ECHR (1993), 35.
51 König v. Federal Republic of Germany, ECHR (1978) Series A, No. 27, 89 (emphasis added).
52 Öztürk v. Federal Republic of Germany, ECHR (1984) Series A, No. 73, 50.
53 Id., at 53 (emphasis added).
54 Demír and Others v. Turkey, ECHR (1998), 153-154.
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principles of interpretation aim to fi nd a common position,55 to achieve a ‘better 
understanding’ of the concrete matter and to ensure that the protected rights are not 
‘theoretical or illusory but practical and effective’.56 It can thus be argued that, when 
combined with a comparative approach, autonomous interpretation comes close to 
evolutive interpretation insofar as their purpose is concerned.57 Nevertheless, there 
is at least one clear difference in the application of these principles, namely between 
the fi elds with respect to which they are employed. The case law of the ECtHR 
shows that the evolutive interpretation is applied to the determination of the scope of 
particular rights and the extent of the positive obligations stemming from those rights 
(such as the scope of the freedom of association), while autonomous interpretation 
is invoked when it comes to interpreting one of the terms in the defi nition of the 
right (like the meaning of ‘civil rights and obligations’) or in relation to certain 
classifi cations. In this respect, the Court seems to be at least consistent. Be this as it 
may, as argued above, this does not justify the application of a comparative method 
in combination with the principle of autonomous interpretation, as conceptually they 
are diffi cult to unite.58 For this reason, the Court should either explain what it means 
by autonomous interpretation or avoid invoking this principle of interpretation or 
comparative arguments in this respect, in order to be theoretically consistent.
4 What to Compare
In order to be methodologically correct, it should also be examined what the Court 
compares and what it should compare in order to assess the margin of appreciation or 
defi ne the scope of rights and obligations. This aspect of the comparative law method 
can be divided into two sub-questions: which legal systems are compared (sources of 
comparison) and at what level of abstraction is this comparison carried out?
 This section addresses these two sub-questions separately. It examines whether 
and to what extent the choice of sources and the chosen level of abstraction for the 
comparative exercise comply with the requirements of consistency and transparency.
4.1 Sources of the Comparison
As already indicated above, in order to establish whether there is a common ground 
concerning a particular aspect of a case, the ECtHR relies on different sources: it 
looks for a common European standard and often also relies on international legal 
55 Letsas argues that the Court in fact looks for a ‘better understanding’ and ‘the moral truth’ of the 
ECHR rights. Letsas, above n. 23, at 295-305.
56 Letsas, above n. 23, at 302.
57 Letsas observes and argues that ‘the Court ruled that autonomous concepts should be interpreted 
according to the “common denominator of the respective legislation of the various contracting parties”. 
The introduction of this standard echoes a requirement of consensus: in constructing the meaning of the 
ECHR concepts, the ECtHR must seek to respect and accommodate a certain convergence on meaning 
among the various contracting states.’ Letsas, above n. 23, at 295.
58 In his dissenting opinion in the Öztürk case, Judge Matscher also realised that concerns can be 
raised with respect to the autonomous interpretation. He explains that ‘[i]t goes without saying that 
autonomous interpretation is the method best suited to multilateral conventions, and particularly rule-
making instruments, such as the European Convention on Human Rights. Nonetheless, reliance on this 
method of interpretation raises problems of legal hermeneutics which are far more complex than one 
might at fi rst suppose. These problems above all concern the “value” which should be attributed to the 
law of the State in question and to the legal systems of the other Contracting Parties in the endeavour 
to arrive – having regard to the object and purpose of the Convention – at a common understanding 
underlying the concepts contained in the text.’ Öztürk v. Federal Republic of Germany, ECHR (1984) 
Series A, No. 73, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Matscher, 2.
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norms.59 With respect to the two aims identifi ed above, the following sources can be 
explored in the case law of the Court: international legal norms, ECJ case law and 
EU law, Council of Europe treaties, domestic law and practice, and even the law and 
practice of non-European countries.60
 In the Marckx case, for instance, the Court relied to a lesser extent on the domestic 
law in the contracting states and to a greater degree on two Council of Europe 
treaties as evidence of the evolution and existence of a common ground for defi ning 
the margin of appreciation.61 This case was concerned with the distinction made 
between legitimate and illegitimate children under Article 14 taken in conjunction 
with Article 8 (in addition to Article 8 taken alone). As a justifi cation, the respondent 
government argued that, at the time when the Convention was drafted, it was 
generally accepted to make a distinction between these children. However, by laying 
down that the Convention ‘must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’, 
the Court explained that it ‘cannot but be struck by the fact that the domestic law 
of the great majority of the member States of the Council of Europe has evolved 
and is continuing to evolve, in company with the relevant international instruments, 
towards full juridical recognition of the maxim mater semper certa est.’62 In its further 
elaboration, the Court emphasised the importance of the two treaties that have been 
adopted in this area, both of which have been ratifi ed only by four members of the 
Council of Europe,63 and established that ‘[i]n fact, the existence of these two treaties 
denotes that there is a clear measure of common ground in this area amongst modern 
societies.’64 Thus, the common European standard was established on the basis of 
two Council of Europe treaties that have been ratifi ed by only a small number of 
member states and not with respect to the law and practice in the member states.
 In contrast, but also in the framework of defi ning the concrete margin of 
discretion, the comparison in the Odièvre case focused on the law and practice in 
the contracting states alone, and no reference was made to international documents, 
which gave rise to criticism in the joint dissenting opinion.65 This case concerned the 
right of the applicant to obtain information about her natural family, which confl icted 
with the right of her mother to give birth anonymously. While the majority of the 
Court accepted that ‘most of the contracting states do not have legislation that is 
comparable to that applicable in France’, the joint dissenters criticised this position 
by arguing that the majority ‘fail[s] to refer to the various international instruments 
that play a decisive role in achieving a consensus and which seek to ensure a balance 
59 As Brems observes, ‘[l]ike comparison between the rules and practices of the states parties, 
reference to other conventions is used to point at an international consensus. Sometimes this consensus 
is somewhat wider than that among the member states of the Council of Europe.’ Brems, above n. 9, at 
414.
60 Besides this classifi cation, a further division can also be made on the basis of who has made the 
comparison: experts, public opinion or legal consensus.
61 Marckx v. Belgium, ECHR (1979).
62 Id., at 41.
63 ‘Admittedly, of the ten States that drew up the Brussels Convention, only eight have signed and 
only four ratifi ed it to date. The European Convention of 15 October 1975 on the Legal Status of 
Children born out of Wedlock has at present been signed by only ten and ratifi ed by only four members 
of the Council of Europe. … However, this state of affairs cannot be relied on in opposition to the 
evolution noted above. Both the relevant Conventions are in force and there is no reason to attribute the 
currently small number of Contracting States to a refusal to admit equality between ‘illegitimate’ and 
‘legitimate’ children on the point under consideration.’ Marckx v. Belgium, ECHR (1979), 41.
64 Marckx v. Belgium, ECHR (1979), 41.
65 Odièvre v. France, ECHR (2003), Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Wildhaber, Sir Nicolas 
Bratza, Bonello, Loucaides, Cabral Barreto, Tulkens and Pellonpää.
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between competing rights in individual cases.’66 In contrast to the Marckx case, here 
it was precisely the international developments or trends that the dissenters believed 
were lacking in the determination of the margin of appreciation.
 In the much-discussed Christine Goodwin case, the intervener carried out a 
comparison at the level of the contracting states as well as countries outside Europe 
in order to show that there was a common approach that would narrow the margin 
of appreciation of the respondent state. On the basis of this study, the Court laid 
down that there was no common European approach among the contracting states. 
However, less importance was attached to this ‘than to the clear and uncontested 
evidence of a continuing international [in this case at non-European level – M.A.] 
trend in favour not only of increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal 
recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals.’67 In other 
words, the margin of appreciation of the respondent was narrowed on the basis of 
the law and practice in non-European states, like South-Africa, Canada, the majority 
of US states and others.
 While, in the above cases, the comparison was used to defi ne the margin of 
appreciation, the M.C. case is a good example of the use of international sources of 
law and domestic legislation, in addition to examining the state of the art at the level 
of the Council of Europe, in order to defi ne the positive obligations that arise with 
respect to Articles 3 and 8 (i.e. the scope of these particular rights and the obligations 
stemming from them). To defi ne the obligations of the state ‘to ensure adequate 
protection against rape’, the Court fi rst of all looked at the defi nitions of rape in 
several member states of the Council of Europe, perused some relevant decisions 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and relied on the 
description of this term in the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe on the protection of women against violence.68
 The last example for the application of the comparative law method in assessing 
the scope of the rights and obligations is the recent Demír case. Here, the Court made 
an overview of its case law in which it relied on international law in its comparative 
exercises, concluding that 
[t]he Court, in defi ning the meaning of terms and notions in the text of the Convention, can and must 
take into account elements of international law other than the Convention, the interpretation of such 
elements by competent organs, and the practice of the European States refl ecting their common values. 
The consensus emerging from specialised international instruments and from the practice of contracting 
States may constitute a relevant consideration for the Court when it interprets the provisions of the 
Convention in specifi c cases.69
These examples clearly show that the sources of comparison differ widely in the 
case law of the Court, irrespective of the aim of the comparison. Two main problems 
can be identifi ed in the Court’s approach in this respect: the combination of the 
source and aim of the comparison is theoretically problematic and, as mentioned, the 
selected sources differ on a case-by-case basis.
 First of all, given that the doctrine is based on the principle of subsidiarity, it is 
quite striking from the perspective of theoretical consistency that, in its search for 
66 Id., at 15.
67 Christine Goodwin v. the Kingdom, ECHR (2002), 85. See also I. v. the United Kingdom, ECHR 
(2002).
68 M.C. v. Bulgaria, ECHR (2003). ‘166. In the light of the above, the Court is persuaded that any 
rigid approach to the prosecution of sexual offences, such as requiring proof of physical resistance in 
all circumstances, risks leaving certain types of rape unpunished and thus jeopardizing the effective 
protection of the individual’s sexual autonomy. In accordance with contemporary standards and trends 
in that area, the member States positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention must be 
seen as requiring the penalization and effective prosecution of any non-consensual sexual act, including 
in the absence of physical resistance by the victim.’
69 Demír and Baykara v. Turkey, ECHR (2008), 85.
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the concrete margin of appreciation, the Court uses international or non-European 
sources. Nevertheless, as argued, this reliance on international law can to some 
extent be explained by the fact that the member states of the Council of Europe are 
also part of this international legal system. For this reason, the subsidiarity principle 
can also be indirectly invoked in this respect. In any event, comparison at the 
international level seems to emphasise implicitly the universality and distinctiveness 
of the validity of rights and obligations in the Convention, as opposed to functioning 
as the lowest common denominator. Arguably, the use of international sources can 
be combined with the assessment of the scope of rights and obligations, since the 
Court’s task is to ensure the enhanced protection of Convention rights and enforce 
the obligations stemming from them. In other words, the Court is not (or much less) 
bound by subsidiarity considerations in this respect. However, this is clearly not the 
case with respect to the determination of the margin of appreciation. As explained, 
the latitude a state enjoys is defi ned on the basis of the legitimate aim it pursues. This 
means that the extent of the margin of appreciation is defi ned from the perspective 
of the respondent state. Accordingly, it seems unreasonable to invoke international 
instruments, since the respondent state has ratifi ed a European treaty. However, this 
does not mean that some international treaties that are ratifi ed by the member states 
of the Council of Europe could not be invoked, as the states are also parties to these 
instruments.
 In addition, it is essential that the application of the sources of comparison is 
consistent across the cases and that the choice made is transparent. As the above 
cases generally illustrate, the choice of the concrete source is decisive for the result 
of comparison. In this respect, the Christine Goodwin case is quite remarkable, as 
a comparison is possible with previous cases on the same issue. In the Christine 
Goodwin case, the Court used international sources, on the basis of which it came to 
a different conclusion than it did in earlier cases concerning the rights of transsexuals 
where it solely examined the law and practice of the contracting states. As indicated 
above, there might be evolution insofar as the existence and ratifi cation of international 
treaties are concerned, which would justify an international comparison. However, 
the Court should at least clarify why it has chosen a particular source of comparison.
4.2 Level of Abstraction in the Comparison
It has been observed that in some cases the Court examines the countries’ general 
direction concerning the disputed issue, while in other cases it requires that the 
member states’ approach be comparable in terms of concrete provisions or measures.70
 In this respect, the Sheffi eld case has been regarded as quite controversial. In this 
case, the Court had to examine whether or not a positive obligation existed under 
Article 8 to modify a system which post-operative transsexuals claim operates to 
their prejudice. In order to fi nd an answer to this question, comparative exercises 
were carried out. The ECtHR was 
not fully satisfi ed that the legislative trends outlined by amicus suffi ce to establish the existence of any 
common European approach to the problems created by the recognition in law of post-operative gender 
status. In particular, the survey does not indicate that there is as yet any common approach as to how to 
address the repercussions which the legal recognition of a change of sex may entail for other areas of 
law such as marriage, fi liation, privacy or data protection, or the circumstances in which a transsexual 
may be compelled by law to reveal his or her pre-operative gender.71 
Instead of examining whether a general trend to recognise the post-operative gender 
of transsexuals could be identifi ed in the contracting states, the Court required that 
70 See inter alia Brems, above n. 9, at 417-418.
71 Sheffi eld and Horsham v. the United Kingdom, ECHR (1998), 57.
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member states have similar regulations in all aspects related to gender alteration. 
With respect to this case, Brems observed that ‘a stricter interpretation of the 
consensus criterion was used, requiring not just agreement on the general direction, 
but also on concrete measures.’72 In fact, the Court employed two different levels 
of abstraction. While the original question was whether a duty exists as regards the 
legal recognition of the post-operative gender status of transsexuals, the comparison 
for determining the existence of a common standard was made with respect to the 
concrete rules that have been adopted to address the repercussions arising from the 
legal recognition of this status.
 These two levels of abstraction can also be observed in the Christine Goodwin 
case, albeit in a somewhat different form. Here, with respect to Article 8, the Court 
refused to give any weight to the concrete measures that the states had adopted 
concerning the legal recognition of transsexuals and at the same time acknowledged 
the ‘statutory recognition of gender re-assignment’ in a couple of non-European 
countries. The Court explained that 
[i]n accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, it is indeed primarily for the contracting states to 
decide on the measures necessary to secure Convention rights within their jurisdiction and, in resolving 
within their domestic legal systems the practical problems created by the legal recognition of post-
operative gender status, the contracting states must enjoy a wide margin of appreciation. The Court 
accordingly attaches less importance to the lack of evidence of a common European approach to the 
resolution of the legal and practical problems posed, than to the clear and uncontested evidence of a 
continuing international trend in favour not only of increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of 
legal recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals.73 
The Court used one level of abstraction for examining the existence or lack of a 
common European standard and one for exploring the ‘international trend’. With 
respect to the former, the comparison was carried out at a more concrete level, while 
in the international context a more abstract (and arguably the correct) comparison 
was realised.
 Correspondingly, the dissenting opinions in the Evans case concerning the 
withdrawal of one party’s consent to an in vitro fertilisation treatment can be 
interpreted as implicitly criticising the level of abstraction at which consensus was 
looked for. In the view of the dissenters, ‘the fact that different States strike the 
balance [with respect to the withdrawal of the consent of the parties] at different 
points … is not decisive if we consider that what counts most is how best to secure 
the confl icting rights of individualised parties.’74 Following this observation, 
the dissenters briefl y discussed the comparative law existing in this respect. This 
observation of the dissenters can arguably also be interpreted as indicating that the 
comparison should not be carried out at the level of concrete regulations but that the 
consensus should concern how different states try to resolve such confl icting rights.
 As the above cases clearly show, the choice of the level of comparison can also be 
decisive for the fi nal outcome of the comparative exercise and thus plays an important 
role in this context. The above-mentioned examples show that the comparative law 
method was not applied in a consistent and transparent manner. On the one hand, the 
Court was clearly not consistent across the cases in its choice of a particular level of 
abstraction; on the other hand, it did not explain why it chose that particular level of 
abstraction.
 Arguably, two considerations seem to be relevant in identifying the level of 
abstraction for the comparison. First of all, it is generally accepted by the Court 
that the choice of the concrete means to achieve the aims of the Convention is left 
72 Brems, above n. 9, at 418.
73 Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, ECHR (2002), 85 (emphasis added). See also I. v. the 
United Kingdom, ECHR (2002), which was concerned with similar problems and was decided on the 
same day by the Court using the same arguments.
74 Evans v. the United Kingdom, ECHR (2007), Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Traja and Mijović, 5.
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to the contracting states. In other words, it is not for the Court to tell the states 
which concrete provisions they should adopt as long as the goals are reached. In 
this respect, states always have a ‘basic’ margin of appreciation, which would 
indicate that the comparison should and cannot be engaged in at this concrete level. 
Secondly, the level of abstraction should defer to the level at which the concrete 
rights or interests have been formulated.75 As the Evans case demonstrates, while the 
original question was how to strike a balance between the confl icting interests, the 
comparative exercise was undertaken in relation to a very specifi c question. It can be 
concluded that if the comparison is carried out at a more concrete level than the level 
at which the original question as to the violation of the right at stake is formulated, 
the comparison cannot serve as proper evidence or an appropriate argument that 
could tilt the balance in favour of either position.
5 How to Compare
The last question that needs to be addressed relates to the realisation of the 
comparison. In this context, at least three sub-issues can be identifi ed and examined. 
These are: the occurrence of the comparison, the thoroughness of the comparison 
and the interpretation of the comparison.
 This fi nal section examines whether the realisation of the comparative exercise 
fulfi ls the requirements of the rule law. More specifi cally, it analyses whether and 
to what extent the occurrence, thoroughness and interpretation of the result of the 
comparative exercise are transparent and consistent.
5.1 Occurrence of the Comparison
The Court does not rely on comparative arguments in all cases that are or at least 
seem to be comparable to each other in principle.76
 In this context, examples can be found inter alia in cases concerning confl icting 
rights. In these cases, the justifi cation ground is ‘the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others’ with respect to which the margin of appreciation is determined. 
For instance, in the Odièvre case, concerning the question whether one can obtain 
identifying information about one’s natural family in the case of anonymous child 
abandonment,77 the Court made use of the comparative method and used the result 
of comparison as a weighty argument. However, no comparison was carried out, for 
instance, in Öllinger78 (concerning the confl ict between the right to peaceful assembly 
and the right to manifest one’s religion) or Pini and Others79 (concerning the confl ict 
between the applicants’ right to develop family ties with their adopted children and 
the children’s interests). Similarly, in relation to the ‘prevention of disclosure of 
information received in confi dence’ as a justifi cation ground, the Court did not make 
use of comparison in each and every case. For instance, in the Stoll case, concerning 
the applicant’s conviction for ‘secret offi cial deliberations’ as an alleged violation 
75 See inter alia R.C. Green, ‘Interest defi nition in equal protection: a study of judicial technique’ 
(1998) 108 Yale Law Journal 439 at 441, 444-447; J.H. Gerards, Belangenafweging bij rechterlijke 
toetsing aan fundamentele rechten (2006) at 8; M.J. Busstra, ‘De afweging gewogen. Een analyse van 
twee tegenstrijdige uitspraken ten aanzien van de SGP en het vrouwenkiesrecht’ (2008) 169 Themis 
235 at 236-237; F.M. Coffi n, ‘Judicial balancing: the protean scales of justice’ (1998) 63 New York 
University Law Review 16 at 29.
76 With respect to confl icting rights, see also Henrard and Busstra, above n. 27, at 16-18.
77 Odièvre v. France, ECHR (2003).
78 Öllinger v. Austria, ECHR (2006).
79 Pini and Others v. Romania, ECHR (2004).
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of his right to freedom of expression, a comparison was carried out.80 In contrast, 
no comparative considerations were brought up, for instance, in the Bluf! case, in 
which the seizure and subsequent withdrawal of a particular issue of a journal was 
at stake.81
 These cases demonstrate once again that the Court is not consistent across cases 
in applying the comparative law method and that it also does not offer reasons for 
applying or dispensing with the comparative approach. Arguably, if a comparative 
exercise that proved to be decisive was carried out with respect to a term or expression 
(be it one of the justifi cation grounds or related to the scope of rights and obligations), 
the Court should not refrain from relying on the comparative law method in other 
similar cases –except, obviously, in very clear cases. A comparison could arguably 
only be refused if a case raises an issue in relation to which a comparison in a similar 
case has already revealed a common position. Importantly, however, the interval that 
has elapsed between the decision in the similar case and the case in question should 
not be too long, as the situation may have evolved in the meantime. In any event, the 
Court should explain why it is or is not carrying out a comparison. Admittedly, the 
facts submitted by the applicant, the respondent government and/or the third party 
also determine whether a comparison is made, since in most cases it is one of the 
parties that makes or suggests a comparison. However, this does not take away the 
need for an explicit reasoning for using or waiving the comparison.
5.2 Thoroughness of the Comparison
The Court has often been criticised to the effect that the comparison it carries out is 
very superfi cial.82 Even judges have expressed their disapproval of the incompleteness 
of the comparison. For instance, in the Öztürk case, Judge Matscher argued in his 
dissenting opinion that the comparison should have been ‘of a far more detailed 
nature than those carried out so far by the Convention institutions.’83 In practice, 
the thoroughness with which a comparison is carried out varies widely, from a deep 
state-by-state analysis to merely acknowledging the existence or lack of a common 
approach without any further elaboration.
 In the Stoll case, for instance, the Grand Chamber relied on a detailed comparative 
study made by a rapporteur concerning a resolution of the Council of Europe84 and 
considered a number of Council of Europe resolutions. Moreover, it referred to the 
practice of the UN Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights. Similarly, in the M.C. case, the Court relied on the comparative analysis made 
by the intervener. ‘The intervener stated that over the past two decades the traditional 
defi nition of rape had undergone reform in civil and common law jurisdictions and 
in international law. … [It] submitted copies of reports on the relevant law of several 
European and non-European countries, prepared by legal scholars or professionals, 
or by research assistants.’85 Extensive comparative analysis can also be discovered 
80 Stoll v. Switzerland, ECHR (2007), 107.
81 Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! v. the Netherlands, ECHR (1995).
82 Carozza argues that the Court’s comparative ‘analysis is remarkably casual, superfi cial, and 
incomplete.’ P.G. Carozza, ‘Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law in International Human Rights: 
Some Refl ections on the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (1998) 73 Notre Dame 
Law Review 1217 at 1224. See also Arai-Takahashi, above n. 15, at 197; J. Kokott, The Burden of Proof 
in Comparative and International Human Rights Law (1998) at 224; Henrard and Busstra, above n. 27, 
at 17-18.
83 Öztürk v. Federal Republic of Germany, ECHR (1984) Series A, No. 73, Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Matscher, A.2.
84 Stoll v. Switzerland, ECHR (2007), 44. and 107.
85 M.C. v. Bulgaria, ECHR (2003), 126 and 129.
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when the principle of evolutive interpretation is applied, since in these cases the 
Court explicitly wants to draw attention to the existence or absence of any concrete 
developments in the fi eld. This was the case, for instance, with respect to the legal 
position of transsexuals.86
 In contrast, in many instances, the Court merely ‘refers in general to the presence 
or absence of a consensus, in “the law” of “the member states”, without undertaking 
any thorough comparative research.’87 For instance, in the Sunday Times case, the 
Court stated without any explicit examination that ‘[t]he domestic law and practice 
of the Contracting States reveal a fairly substantial measure of common ground in 
this area.’88
 Again, there is a lack of consistency (both theoretically and across cases) and 
transparency concerning the thoroughness of the comparison. Arguably, a superfi cial 
comparison cannot serve as an appropriate means of evidence that could tilt the 
balance in favour of either argument. This means that it is not appropriate if the 
Court merely concludes that there is a common approach on the basis of which it 
establishes the concrete extent of the margin of appreciation or draws far-reaching 
conclusions with respect to the scope of rights and obligations. The Court should 
make its arguments explicit, otherwise the comparative technique becomes subjective 
and, thus, arbitrary.
5.3 Interpretation of the Comparison
Signifi cant differences exist in the interpretation of the comparative exercise. Several 
dissenting opinions are telling in this respect. The example par excellence of diverging 
or confl icting interpretations of the comparison are the cases regarding transsexuals. 
Brems also criticises the comparative exercise of the Court in this respect when she 
states that ‘[t]he transsexualism cases cast some doubt on the objective character of 
the consensus criterion.’89 For instance, in the Cossey case, the majority ruled that at 
that time there was no common ground among the member states on the recognition 
in law of post-operative gender status. However, the dissenters interpreted the same 
facts in the opposite way, concluding that there was a common European standard 
on this issue.90
 It is not only in the transsexual cases that one fi nds such confl icting readings; 
other examples can also be found. For instance, in the Odièvre case, seven judges 
in their joint dissenting opinion argued that ‘the suggestion that the States had to be 
afforded a margin of appreciation owing to the absence of a common denominator 
between their domestic laws simply does not tally with the extracts of comparative 
law on which the Court itself relies.’91 Similarly, the dissenters in the Hirst case also 
disagreed with the conclusion drawn from the comparative exercise concerning the 
scope of a right; namely whether or not prisoners have the right to vote. In their 
words 
86 See Rees v. the United Kingdom, ECHR (1986) Series A, No. 106; Cossey v. the United Kingdom, 
ECHR (1990) Series A, No. 184; Sheffi eld and Horsham v. the United Kingdom, ECHR (1998); 
Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, ECHR (2002); I. v the United Kingdom, ECHR (2002).
87 Brems, above n. 9, at 419.
88 Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, ECHR (1979) Series A, No. 30, 59.
89 Brems, above n. 9, at 417.
90 See also Sheffi eld and Horsham v. the United Kingdom, ECHR (1998).
91 Odièvre v. France, ECHR (2003), Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Wildhaber, Sir Nicolas 
Bratza, Bonello, Loucaides, Cabral Barreto, Tulkens and Pellonpää, 12.
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[a]n ‘evolutive’ or ‘dynamic’ interpretation should have a suffi cient basis in changing conditions in 
societies of the Contracting States, including an emerging consensus as to the standards to be achieved. 
We fail to see that this is so in the present case. Our conclusion is that the legislation in Europe shows 
that there is little consensus about whether or not prisoners should have the right to vote.92
Again, these cases reveal that the Court’s interpretation of the result of the 
comparison has been inconsistent and obscure. Arguably, such confl icting readings 
are mainly caused by a methodologically incorrect comparison. In other words, if the 
comparison is carried out properly, the result of the comparison would not have given 
rise to such confl icting readings. This also means that when the Court realises that 
there is no agreement on the interpretation of the comparison, it should look again to 
see where the accomplishment of the comparative exercise went wrong. Moreover, 
in order to prevent confl icting readings of the comparison, the Court should clearly 
explain which facts provided the basis for its conclusion.
6 Conclusions
This analysis of several cases of the European Court of Human Rights in which 
the comparative law method was given too much weight demonstrates that, in 
many respects, the comparative exercises of the Court do not comply with the 
requirements set by the formal conception of the rule of law: the application of the 
comparative law method is neither consistent nor transparent enough. For this reason 
the comparison carried out by the Court should not guide the Court’s adjudication to 
such a crucial extent, as the faults made during the comparative exercise ultimately 
have far-reaching consequences for the decision taken.93 In any event, the Court 
should not attribute too much value to the result of comparison, which should 
simply be regarded as one of the factors in the determination of either the margin of 
appreciation or the scope of rights and obligations.
 This paper has identifi ed three elements of the comparative law method and has 
examined whether and to what extent they comply with the principle of the rule of 
law. These elements are: the aim of the comparison (why to compare), the sources 
and level of abstraction of the comparison (what to compare), and the realisation 
of the comparison (how to compare). In this respect, the most complicated aspect 
of the comparative law method is the identifi cation and conceptual clarifi cation of 
the particular aims of comparison. In addition, the case law illustrates that, given 
the conceptual uncertainties concerning the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, 
the sources of the comparison are not chosen in a (theoretically) consistent and 
transparent manner. With regard to the aims and the respective sources of the 
comparison, comparing the law and practice of the member states of the Council of 
Europe arguably puts the emphasis on the subsidiarity principle and the Convention’s 
nature as a minimum standard for the parties. In contrast, the reliance on international 
law and practice implicitly emphasises the Court’s position as a supranational human 
rights organ whose aim is the enhancement of the protection of fundamental rights. 
This seems diffi cult to combine with the subsidiarity considerations underlying the 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation. Unlike the margin of appreciation doctrine 
and the limitation clauses, however, the determination of the scope of rights and 
92 Hirst v. the United Kingdom, ECHR (2005), Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Wildhaber, Costa, 
Lorenzen, Kovler and Jebens, 6.
93 See also Letsas, who poses the question why the Court ever turned to consensus. His answer is that 
‘[m]any people and many judges resort to what “most states do” because they are not confi dent in the 
objectivity of moral reasoning. Other reasons fl ow from the traditional tendency to look at international 
law as consent-based relations among sovereign states, a tendency that forces some ECtHR judges to 
feel like the guardians of their country’s sovereignty. None of these reasons, however, fi ts the history of 
the ECHR practice or serves some value embedded in that history. Letsas, above n. 23, at 281, 305.
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obligations can be combined with the Court’s role as an international supervisory 
organ, and for this reason comparison at the international level is conceptually 
appropriate. Nevertheless, the Court should provide logical and discernable reasoning 
and be consistent across cases with regard to any choices made in the context of the 
comparative law method.
